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Given the warm reception that greeted that proposal, we felt compelled to respond by extending our arguments to the. contemporary policy debate. Since we published our proposal, several competing CDB plans have emerged. Unfortunately, many of them seek to employ community banks as vehicles for satisfying requirements of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), rather than as genuine instruments of community development.
Granted, there are myriad community development corporations that focus on credit availability for the poor; however, the vast majority of these institutions only address the housing market. We believe that any attempt Furthermore, an economic decline in a neighborhood, perhaps caused by factors extraneous to the community, may lead to a reduction in its creditworthiness, as judged by lending officers, and in turn may contribute further to the decline. Government action in this area is entirely appropriate because of the increase in social costs of a deteriorating community. This is made readily apparent by empty and decaying buildings found in some neighborhoods, but the costs in human capital losses are equally enormous, even if they are not so visible. Empty homes and closed businesses mean unemployment with concomitant losses to the individuals and to society.
The purpose of the CRA was to halt such decline and ensure that credit flows would continue in communities at levels adequate to prevent cumulative, negative feedback effects of any downward spiral.
To evaluate whether banks are meeting the needs of their communities, the CRA established guidelines used by examiners for assessment (see Federal
Financial Institutions Examination
Council [FFIEC] 1992, and Knodell 1992) . Included in the assessment factors are: types of credit services available, credit application practices, geographic distribution of credit extensions, evidence of discrimination, opening and closing of offices, loan origination, and participation in federal government loan programs. Examiners from the agencies that regulate the banks periodically assess compliance with the CRA: Each bank must provide information to the examiners and make the information available to the community to facilitate public knowledge of its community reinvestment practices.
The CRA applies to all federally insured commercial banks, savings banks, and savings associations; it does not apply to bank holding companies, correspondent banks, trust companies, check clearing agencies, and credit unions. According to Knodell (1992) , compliance with the CRA is evaluated with respect to two broad categories: a) is the bank engaged in sufficient activity to "market" its services in its defined community; and b) are its services actually being used in the defined community. With regard to the first category, each bank must demonstrate that it has defined its market area, identified the financial services required in the market, and made adequate effort in providing information regarding its services to all segments of the defined community. Specifically, the bank must show that it is not systematically and unreasonably excluding any segment of the community in its marketing activities. The second category evaluates the contribution the bank actually makes to the community: This involves review of 10 Public Policy Brief Community Reinvestment Act loan applications and denials, opening and closing of offices, types of services provided at offices, and participation in community development projects. De fucro redlining and discrimination would be identified if there were unreasonable disparities in provision of financial services across geographic areas by race, gender, or ethnic composition. The primary purpose of the CRA is to ensure that the management of each covered financial institution should be actively involved in formulating a business plan so that the institution will market its services to all segments of its community (Knodell 1992) . H owever, there are no specific guidelines regarding the level of use of its services that must be attained in its community+ither by the community as a whole or by specific groups within the community.
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We believe that while investment in a community development bank should be considered during the CRA evaluation for a depository institution, the institution should not be exempted from the process since this is not consistent with the spirit of CRA. As discussed above, the CRA evaluation process is the primary context in which a dialogue between the institution and its community takes place. For reasons to be discussed below, this can play an important role in helping to change the banking community's expectations regarding underserved neighborhoods.
Community development banks will further this process by proving that some underserved areas do, in fact, have projects that can be profitably financed. Further, allowing a commercial bank to avoid the CRA process merely by investing in a community development bank (that may have a much wider service area than the commercial bank) dilutes this process of dialogue'between the bank and the community it serves. Instead, the commercial bank's community should be defined as that which it serves directly, and not as that served by all institutions that have invested in a particular community development bank. Finally, the limited and often minuscule investment in a community development bank envisioned in some proposals (as low as one-quarter of 1% of assets) cannot substitute for the CRA evaluation process, which determines the extent to which the institution has "reinvested" in its community.
Senator Bradley's proposal, titled the "Community Capital Partnership Act of 1993," is much more similar in spirit to ours. This act would provide federal assistance to community development financial institutions in the form of operating assistance or capital assistance to community lenders that wish to expand activities into areas identified as consistent with the CDB model. This model is based on nonprofit lenders in target areas that routinely make small loans or equity investments. While our model deviates in several respects from this proposal, neither would weaken the CRA.
Before examining how a system of CDBs can supplement the CRA, we analyze evidence of discrimination and redlining in lending and in other financial services that must be provided by a financial system. We argue that neither free market forces nor the CRA alone can ensure that a sufficient supply of financial services reaches every community.
II I. Lending Discrimination and Redlining
Discrimination and redlining are pervasive phenomena, .particularly in the home mortgage market. Profit-seeking behavior of private financial institu-
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Community Reinvestment Act tions does not eliminate either problem. A brief analysis of each problem will help us to understand why this is the case. We begin with the process through which loans are solicited and evaluated.
A. Loan Solicitation and Application F'rocesses
By soliciting customers, a financial institution plays an important role in the initiation of loans. It must define its market area and identify potential customers; it must then provide information to potential customers. In turn, customers are generated in the mortgage market only after the sale of real estate has been initiated. Consequently, any processes that systematically deny equal access to real estate will automatically bias mortgage markets. If sellers or their agents discriminate by race, gender, or other characteristic, then banks will not be able to solicit-mortgage business fro'm those so excluded: If real estate developers systematically avoid new projects or restoration in certain neighborhoods, banks will not be able to solicit mortgage business in these areas. Such discrimination is beyond the control of financial institutions. Even if this sort of discrimination does not occur, selective solicitation by banks can lead to the exclusion of some from the mortgage business.
Once customers have been solicited, there are at least five important factors that contribute to a successful loan application process. First, the process is designed to uncover borrower characteristics: credit history, income, outgo, net worth, and collateral. Given this information, banks will try to estimate the ability of the customer to service the loan. Second, the process must consider the loan characteristics: principal amount, the interest rate, and the use of the loan. Third, the bank must consider cyclical characteristics of the economy (including both regional and national cycles). Fourth, it must estimate the prospective income flows of each class of borrowers on the basis of longer trend characteristics of the economy (both regional and national). Fifth, the loan officer must apply various rules of thumb (some formal, others informal) in evaluating the borrower in terms of the ability to pay: This is based on borrower characteristics, expected income flows, the interest rate, and maximum loan amount among other factors.
Provision of credit is not like the sale of a commodity; it is a very complex process that usually involves substantial face-to-face interaction.
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B. Loan Acceptance or Rejection
The application process ends when the bank accepts or rejects the loan application. Rejection can occur for a variety of reasons: the borrower's income flows, debt burden, collateral, wealth, credit history, or "character" may be nonconforming either with respect to the bank's standards, or with regard to underwriting standards adopted in secondary markets.
Alternatively, the characteristics of the Zoun may not meet rules of thumb established by the bank, by supervising agencies, or by secondary markets:
The size of the loan request may have been too small (given loan initiation and servicing costs, there is a minimum size of loan each bank can profitably provide at a competitive interest rate) or too large (each-bank has formal and informal rules regarding size of any single loan-usually equal to a fraction of the bank's net worth). The loan may be also nonconforming with respect to underwriting standards of secondary markets in a number of ways (e.g., a mortgage on housing that does not meet FHA standards).
Furthermore, the loan may be prohibited by supervisory agencies for a number of reasons, or the proposed use of the loan may conflict with regulatory practice. Finally, the application may be rejected due to &scrimimztion by the loan officer or by other bank officers, or due to the practice of "redlining."
In essence, the complexity of the loan process provides many points at which those who probably cowld successfully service a loan at an interest rate that would be profitable to the bank will not receive credit. 'As stated earlier, discrimination and redlining only exacerbate the problem It could be argued that minorities receive less credit only because they are less creditworthy, since their income and wealth tend to be lower. The degree of access to credit has a direct impact on the creditworthiness of a borrower over a lifetime. The volume of liabilities one may issue, as well as the terms on which they are issued, will affect almost every important factor that will determine an individual's economic success-from the quantity and quality of education and training one may receive to the type of productive activity the individual will pursue as a career. In other words, adequate access to credit at reasonable terms is essential for many activities that will, to a great extent, determine an individual's success at servicing debt. If a segment of society faces discriminatory treatment in this regard, it wiZ1 be less creditworthy (Isenberg and Dymski 1992).
Finally, loan officers and bank owners have a narrow view of their market.
The types of activity that can be profitably financed cannot be known. As
John Maynard Keynes said, it is sometimes better to follow the leader and to be conventionally wrong than it is to be unconventionally correct. Others argue that the recent trend toward securitization (particularly of home mortgages) will equalize access to credit. Since the initiating bank is not going to hold the securitized loan, it should not care whether the borrower is a white male. However, this still ignores the fact that loan solicitation and application processes provide ample opportunity for discrimination. Even in the case of securitized and government-guaranteed mortgages, the application process often includes the face-to-face interview. Indeed, securitization could actually decrease the supply of credit to some groups if secondary market underwriting criteria bias the process against some groups (see Isenberg and Dymski 1992, and Dymski 1993 , for an analysis of secondary market bias against low-income and minority grou@).
2) Redlining: Unlike discrimination, which has to do &ith the borrower's characteristics, redlining has to do with the characteristics of the neighborhood. A bank that engages in redlining demarcates an area in which it will not normally lend. TMs need not be irrational: Some neighborhoods will have much higher default rates than others because of "spillovers" or uexternalities"two identical individuals might experience very different default rates merely because they live in different neighborhoods. The redlined neighborhoods will be avoided in loan solicitation (thus, fewer applications will be received), and applicants from these neighborhoods will face systematically higher rates of rejection. In redlining, the face-to-face nature of the application does not play a major role in denial; only the characteristics of the neighbokhood matter. Redlining will not be eliminated by "free markets, B since pu 1 e redlining is often regarded as a good business practice.
The appropriate test for pure redlining is to see whether loan solicitation is reduced and loan rejection is higher in specific neighborhoods.
In practice, however, racial discrimination is often involved in redlining. If race is associated with neighborhoods with undesirable characteristics, it can be used as an indicator of these unwanted characteristics.
In essence, if minorities tend to live in neighborhoods with socioeconomic factors that lead to problem loans, race alone can be used to identify communities to be redlined. Loans are then not solicited from minority neighborhoods, or they are denied more frequently in these neighborhoods. The appropriate test for such "racial redlining" is the race of the neighborhood (that is, identifying neighborhoods by percent. minority) rather than the race of the applicant.
Racial redlining will likely be interpreted as illegal discrimination, whereas pure redlining is not necessarily illegal-so long as the case can be made that the likelihood of a problem loan is higher for each rejected applicant.
Public Policy Brief Community

Reinvestment Act
Because access to credit is so important to economic success of individuals, it will also be important to the economic success of a neighborhood. If credit is systematically denied to a neighborhood, that community will almost certainly suffer economic decline. Redlining iffects to the greatest extent the value of geographically fixed assets (particularly homes and small businesses) where spillovers can be large (Dymski 1993) . For these assets, the value is not determined only (or even primarily) by its own condition, but also by that of the perceived condition of the surrounding environment. Obviously, the value of a home will be determined substantially by its neighborhood. Rehabilitation of one home in a neighborhood will have significant spillover effects on others: If all the homes in the neighborhood were to receive rehabilitation loans, each homeowner could capture the spillover effects -but if only one owner rehabilitates, he/she cannot recapture the spillovers. This is analogous to the activities of the lending banks: Only if others will lend to a neighborhood can spillovers be captured, but no bank wants to be the sole lender. The process a so works in Y reverse: If some banks withdraw from a neighborhood, "market forces" will lead to further withdrawals.
Since the net worth of a home (or business) is a primary determinant of accessto credit, those homeowners and business people who find their geographically fixed assets are in the "wrong" neighborhood will also find their access to credit is cut off as their net worth falls (Dymski 1993). "Free markets," therefore, will punish such neighborhoods: No individual bank can lend in the neighborhood unless others are willing to do so because the "externalities" created by redlining will increase the likelihood of loan problems faced by the lender that does not redline.
There is evidence of discrimination and of redlining. In October 1991, data from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) indicated that minorities receive loans at a rate far lower than comparable whites. As an example, according to national data, blacks are turned down two and one-half times more frequently than whites. According to a study by the FRB of Boston, even after taking account of economic and other nonracial factors (income, weakh, lower value of housing), housing and mortgage credit markets function in a way that hurts black neighborhoods in Boston (Bradbury, Case, and Dunham 1989) . Indeed, the authors found that the ratio of mortgage loans to housing varies systematically by race: Black neighborhoods receive 24% fewer mortgages, even after controlling for a variety of nonracial variables. Minority applicants were 60°h more likely than whites to be rejected for mortgages, even after controlling for the nonracial variables. Caskey (1992) found that communities with a majority of black and/or Hispanic residents are substantially less likely to have a local bank: Indeed, the mean number of banks (including branches) per census tract with a majority of blacks and/or Hispanics is less than half that of "nonminority" tracts.
Furthermore, Caskey found some evidence that recent bank closures have disproportionately affected low-income and minority communities, and similar results for other cities were found by Leichter (1989) .
Every financial institution has a "preferred habitat"-a geographically and functionally defined area within which it operates. Furthermore, the type and size of services that will be provided are a function of the size of the financial institution. For example, banks have traditionally used "rules of thumb" (often also adopted by regulatory agencies) that link the maximum size of loan made to the size of the bank's equity; a ratio of 5% to 10% is common. This means that a bank with $500 million in equity can ma&e loans as large as $50 million, while a bank with $500,000 of equity can make loans as large as $50,000. The rapid decline of small, independent financial institutions has reduced the number of "small deals" that are likely to be made.
Third, bankers proceed for the most part on the basis of what has been successful in the past, and they operate to a great extent on the basis of informal (and sometimes formal) rules of thumb. They are (and should be) wary of unfamiliar activities, neighborhoods, and characteristics of borrowers. It is not surprising that conventional banks are reluctant to lend in some neighborhoods. The CRA process can play an essential role in breaking down cultural prejudices by allowing bankers to interact with their communities. This is an ongoing process that may take many years to reap substantial benefits (that is, to increase the supply of credit to underserved areas through conventional banking practices). To facilitate the transition, nontraditional alternatives are needed. As those who are already engaged in community development banking frequently argue, it is easier to make a banker out of a community activist than it is to make a community activist out of a banker. We would not want to go too far with this line of thought;
however, there is something to the claim that conventional banks may never become good "community banks." Hence, we propose an alternative system of CDBs that will be designed from the ground up to provide a limited range of services to specific communities that are not now well served.
Geographic and functional specialization will allow the ,CDBs to face lower costs in certain well-defined markets or "niches." As the CDBs establish a 22 Public Policy Brief Community Reinvestment Act customer base in the targeted community, they will be able to make the "small deals" that would not be sufficiently profitable for traditional financial institutions. In some cases, the success of the CDBs will encourage the traditional lenders to move into these communities; we would view this as a success.
The establishment of a system of CD@ could increase the availability of credit to creditworthy households that cannot meet the underwriting standards required for secondary mortgage markets. It would also increase the number of institutions whose natural habitat is the small loan;-targeted to communities not currently receiving an adequate supply of small commercial business loans. By keeping the CDBs small, we,can ensure that their focus will be the "small deal." Moreover, by restricting the CDBs geographically and functionally, we can ensure that their focus will remain in their "niche" -areas underserved by traditional financial institutions.
Furthermore, geographic and functional restrictions will allow the CDBs to provide an important supplement to any "enterprise zone" programs.
President Clinton has called for legislation to promote investment and job creation in federally designated zones. His proposal includes job tax credits, investment incentives, and employer wage credits. Estimated outlays may reach $2.4 billion over four years. One option would be to appropriate some of these funds for the establishment of a system of CDBs. This would potentially allow for much greater investment than $2.4 billion in the enterprise zones, because the CDBs would leverage the government's equity investment. [For example, given an investment of $500 million in equity in CDBs, and given an equity-to-asset ratio of 8% for the CDBs, the government's investment in the enterprise zones would be expanded to a maximum of more than $6 billion.]
IV. Tran~, Payments, and Savings Sewices
Traditional financial institutions, for a variety of reasons, are less able and willing to provide transactions, payments, and savings services for lowincome, low-wealth households. First, increased competition from "nonbank banks," such as money market mutual funds, tended to raise the interest rate that had to be paid to attract deposits. As the costs of attracting deposits rose, banks and thrifts turned to increased fees in an attempt to cover these costs. facilities charge as much as 5% to 6% for cashing government checks: Even in states that regulate the maximum allowable fees, the facilities frequently charge more than the legal limit (for example, in a New York study, it was found that 49% of the users of facilities paid more than the legal maximum, and the average overcharge was 44%). '
A family with an annual income of $10,000 would spend about $185 per year if it relied on a check-cashing facility for its transactions and payment services: The same family, with a minimal balance-in a checking account at a bank, would pay about $60 per year if it wrote six checks per month. Those that rely on the more costly check-cashing facilities do so for a variety of reasons: They have no bank account; they need the cash immediately and cannot wait for the check to clear; they are afraid the check will bounce (entailing large fees), or the check-cashing process is more convenient (e.g., location, hours, etc.).
A well-designed CDB system could provide an efficient and equitable alternative to expensive fringe-banking. At the same time, it could bring many of those now excluded into the payments system that most Americans use. Finally, it could offer a safe and secure repository for savings, encouraging thrift in low-income communities that currently do not have adequate access to traditional banks.
V. Community Debvelopmed Banks
We believe that the establishment of a nationwide system of CDBs, as proposed by President Clinton, provides the means to most effectively address the issue of inadequate access to credit. The creation of banks in communities where lending is severely curtailed, if available at all, will enhance the welfare of low-income citizens, inner-city minorities, and entrepreneurs seeking small-scale financing for their businesses. Our proposal for this type of community bank draws from the pilot programs of community lending in Illinois and Arkansas, where the success of the community development bank concept has been demonstrated by the experience of the Shorebank
Corporation of Chicago and the Southern Development Bancorporation in
Arkansas. We will briefly outline the structure of our proposed CDB system.
The basic functions of these CDBs include: (a) the payment system for check cashing and clearing, and credit and debit cards, (b) the secure depos- The primary goals of these CDBs, then, will be to deliver credit, payment, and savings opportunities and provide finance for households and small business throughout a designated area not adequately served by traditional banks, the CBA requirements notwithstanding.
The community service aspects of the proposed CDBs involve the payment mechanism and the savings facility. These require none of the "underwriting and judgment" skills of the banker who takes risks. Under our proposal, each CDB would offer deposit and savings accounts, check-cashing services for depositors, automatic deposit of payroll and government checks, automatic payment (with customer authorization) of certain monthly bills, and credit cards (with a small line of credit determined by the customer's deposit and credit history). This will enable customers to achieve substantial savings over the costs of transactions at check-cashing facilities (or traditional banks) and over the costs of short-term credit provided by pawnshops: It will encourage thrift and responsible financial behavior of customers, and will provide a source of funds to be "reinvested" in the community by the CDB through its loan-making activity.
An assumption underlying the lack of credit facilities assertion is that there are "bankable risks" and feasible "equity investments" in distressed communities that involve dollar amounts too small for the established banking community. Even '%mall" commercial banks customarily handle asset and liability denominations that are larger than those typically generated in low-income communities.
Projects that promise to be profitable but are not being financed because of their small size, their perceived riskiness, or the "inexperience" of the prospective management, under our proposal, would become the aim of the CDBs. Theory and evidence suggest that commercial banks exercise a high degree of discretion when approving a loan, be it for home or business, since no application perfectly meets a guideline for obligation or loan/value 
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